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Abstract 
 
Empirical results using Japanese data suggest that social trust improves student language and 
mathematics achievement test scores in primary and junior high school. After controlling for 
endogeneity bias, social trust had a greater effect on scores for primary school students than on 
scores for junior high school students. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely known that social capital plays an important role in improving economic efficiency 
and thus economic development (Knack and Keefer 1997). In his seminal work, Coleman (1988) 
was the first to argue that social capital leads to human capital formation. Coleman categorized 
social capital into trustworthiness of the social environment, information flow capability of the 
social structure, and norms accompanied by sanctions. However, various proxies for social capital 
seem to play different roles (Bjørnskov 2006; Paldam 2000). Therefore, it is necessary to define 
social capital more rigorously. Recent works have defined social capital as social trust and have 
examined the effect of social trust on education (Bjørnskov 2009; Papagapitos and Riley 2009; 
Yamamura 2010). Papagapitos and Riley (2009) suggested that social trust enhances secondary 
school enrollment. Bjørnskov (2009) indicated that social trust leads to growth of schooling. 
However, little is known about the effect of social trust on the performance of students
1
. From an 
economic viewpoint, it is necessary to explore how and the extent to which social trust influences 
student performance because the return on investment in education is important.  
In Japan, nationwide achievement tests are conducted in primary and junior high school. 
Subtests include mathematics and Japanese language, with basic and applied parts for each subject. 
Student performance is measured by the percentage of correct answers in each category, and 
performance data are available for each prefecture
2
. The average percentages for 2009 are reported 
in Table 1
3
. This paper attempts to investigate how social trust affects percentages of correct 
answers on these tests to examine the effect of social trust on student performance. 
 
                                                   
1
 Anderson (2008) found that various proxies for social capital are positively associated with 
achievement test scores. However, Anderson did not explore the effect of social trust on test scores. 
2
 A Japanese prefecture is roughly the equivalent of a state in the United States or a province in 
Canada.  
3
 Tests were conducted in 47 prefectures; thus, there are 47 observations for each category. 
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2. Data and Model  
Table 2 includes variable definitions and a summary of statistics. The dependent variable was 
percentage of correct answers on the 2009 achievement tests in Japan. To construct a proxy for 
social trust, this paper used data from the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) which were 
conducted between 2000 and 2003. The JGSS included the following question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?” There were three choices for 
respondents: “Yes”, “Depends”, and “No”. To measure the degree of social trust, I quantified the 
choices “Yes”, “Depends”, and “No” as 3, 2, and 1, respectively. In addition, I calculated the 
average value of social trust within a prefecture and used it as a proxy for social trust. This was the 
definition of TRUST
4
. 
The independent variables are discussed below. The estimated function takes the following 
form:  
SCORE i = α0 +α1 TRUST i + α2 GINI i + α3 HC i + α4 INCOM I + α5 SPEDU i +α6 MATH i +α7 
BASIC i +εi, 
where the dependent variable in prefecture i is achievement test scores. The regression parameter is 
represented by α which can be interpreted as elasticity with the exception of dummies
5
; εi 
represents the error term. If social trust improves test scores, TRUST will take the positive sign. 
Consistent with previous research (Bjørnskov 2009; Papagapitos and Riley 2009), other control 
variables including GINI, HC, INCOM and SPEDU are incorporated to capture economic factors. 
                                                   
4
 It is unclear if “Depends” can be considered an intermediate category. This response choice may 
have been selected by a number of respondents who would have answered differently if other 
possible responses had been included in the questionnaire. To alleviate any bias arising from this, I 
used a dummy which takes 1 if the response is “Yes”, otherwise 0, excluding “Depends” from the 
sample as a dependent variable. I obtained similar results from the estimation using this dummy as 
social trust. However, to save space, these results were not reported. They are available upon 
request. 
5
 See more details in Greene (1997, p. 280). 
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MATH and BASIC control for subject and question category, respectively
6
.  
This paper examined the effect of social trust on human capital formation. Conversely, human 
capital appears to influence social trust (Huang, van den Brink, and Groot 2009). The direction of 
causality is thus ambiguous, resulting in endogeneity bias. Hence, I used the GMM 2SLS method to 
control for this bias. This paper follows the work of Bjørnskov (2009), who used a measure of 
absence of corruption as an instrumental variable for social trust when investigating human capital 
growth. The disclosure of official information enables citizens to keep a close eye on corruption, 
thus resulting in a reduction in corruption. Since the 1990s, official information has been disclosed 
when citizens request it
7
. Enactment of official information ordinances is considered to be 
positively related to the relative absence of corruption. Hence, the rate
8
 of towns and villages that 
had issued the disclosure of official information ordinance (OINF) was used as an instrumental 
variable. This rate was calculated for each prefecture. 
Apart from OINF, this paper used additional instrumental variables. People seem to trust 
each other if there is a place where they can communicate with each other. Yamamura (2008) found 
that the number of community centers is positively related to trust in Japan. Therefore, number of 
community centers (CCENT) was used as an instrumental variable. Not meeting with friends 
(NOFRD) was also used as an instrumental variable. One question included in the JGSS was “How 
often do you meet or dine with friends?” There were 7 choices for respondents from 1 (Almost 
every day) to 7 (Never). NOFRD was the rate of “Never” for each prefecture. 
 
 
                                                   
6
 This paper used values of independent variables in 2004 to alleviate endogeneity bias. 
7
 Here, official information is considered information such as official documents, which the local 
government retained and has not disclosed. 
8
 This rate is measured as (number of towns and villages that have issued the disclosure of official 
information ordinance) / (total number of towns and villages). 
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3. Results 
In the interest of brevity, I focused on results for TRUST. The sample size was small. 
Therefore, the jackknife method was used to calculate the standard error to make sure that results 
were not spurious. TRUST yielded the positive sign in all estimations. As reported in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 3, results of the OLS model suggested that junior high school was statistically 
significant, but primary school was not significant. Regarding the GMM 2SLS model shown in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, results of the over-identification test did not reject the null 
hypothesis that TRUST is exogenous for primary and junior high school estimation. TRUST was 
statistically significant for not only junior high school but also for primary school. Furthermore, the 
value of the primary school coefficient was 0.92, which was larger than that for junior high school. 
This suggests that the effect of social trust was greater on test scores of primary school students 
than on scores of junior high school students. These results imply that social trust has a greater role 
in improving performance of students in an early stage of education compared with a later stage. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This study explored how social trust affects achievement test scores, using prefecture level data of 
Japan. Major findings indicate that social trust improves language and mathematics achievement 
scores for primary and junior high school students. After controlling for endogeneity bias, the effect 
of social trust was greater on primary school scores than on junior high school scores.  
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Table 1. Percentage of correct answers on achievement tests 
(1) Primary school 
 Mathematics Japanese language 
 Basic Applied Basic Applied 
Score 79.1 54.4 70.2 50.7 
Observations 47 47 47 47 
 
(2) Junior high school 
 Mathematics Japanese language 
 Basic Applied Basic Applied 
Score 63.1 57.3 77.6 75.2 
Observations 47 47 47 47 
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Table 2. Variable definitions and basic statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
TRUST 
 
Average value of the degree of generalized trust ( 1 = No, 2 = Depends, 
3 = Yes). 
2.08 0.06 2.19 1.95 
GINI 
 
Gini coefficient of income. 0.30 0.01 0.34 0.27 
HC 
 
Percentage of the population who were university graduates (%). 9.8    3.1 21.9 5.5 
INCOM 
 
Per capita income (thousands of yen). 2765 376 4376 2074 
SPEDU 
 
Expenditure on students per capita (thousands of yen).  105.8 16.9 154.3 71.3 
MATH This takes 1 if the observation is for mathematics, otherwise 0. 
 
   --- --- --- --- 
BASIC This takes 1 if the observation is a basic question, otherwise 0. 
 
   --- --- --- --- 
OINF 
 
Rate of towns and villages that had issued the disclosure of official 
information ordinance (%). 
90.0 10.1 100 53.8 
NOFRD 
 
Rate of respondents who never meet or dine with friends. 9.88 2.89 18.6 3.37 
CCENT 
 
Number of community centers per population (population in thousands). 0.22 0.17 0.90 0.07 
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Table 3. Dependent variable: Test scores  
 
Variable (1)  
OLS 
Primary school 
(2) 
OLS 
Junior high school 
(3) 
GMM 2SLS 
Primary school 
(4) 
GMM 2SLS 
Junior high school 
TRUST 
 
0.10 
(0.89) 
0.20* 
(1.70) 
0.92* 
(2.02) 
0.79* 
(1.94) 
GINI 
 
-0.10 
(-1.44) 
-0.31*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.12* 
(-1.66) 
-0.32*** 
(-3.41) 
HC 
 
 0.02** 
  (2.04) 
 -0.04*** 
  (-3.29) 
 0.05*** 
  (2.61) 
 -0.02 
  (-1.26) 
INCOM 
 
 0.02 
 (0.83) 
 0.11*** 
 (3.79) 
 -0.04 
 (-1.24) 
 0.05 
 (1.29) 
SPEDU 
 
 0.05* 
(1.90) 
 0.01 
(0.53) 
 0.08*** 
(2.61) 
 0.03 
(1.19) 
MATH 
 
 6.29*** 
(16.1) 
 -16.2*** 
(-40.8) 
 6.29*** 
(13.8) 
 -16.2*** 
(-36.9) 
BASIC 
 
 22.0*** 
(56.4) 
 4.05*** 
(10.1) 
 22.0*** 
(48.3) 
 4.00*** 
(9.22) 
Constant 
 
 43.0*** 
(4.53) 
 76.2*** 
(7.56) 
 -6.61 
(-0.22) 
 37.6 
(1.44) 
Hansen’s J 
statistics 
  1.14 
P = 0.56 
2.24 
P = 0.32 
Observations 188 188 188 188 
Note. With the exception of the constant and dummies such as MATH and BASIC, values are 
elasticity evaluated at the sample means (Greene, 1997, pp. 278-280).. Values in parentheses are 
t-statistics calculated by standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
